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1 Disclaimer
Linda Zagzebski's Epistemic Authority is a wonderful book, and I learned a
great deal from reading it. But philosophers are trained to disagree, so disagree
I shall. (I would be glad to learn that the distance between us is more apparent
than real.)
2 Tradition as Transmission
In discussing religious authority in ch. 9 of her book, Zagzebski distinguishes
three conceptions of how divine revelation is transmitted through a religious
tradition. According to one of these conceptions, which henceforth I'll call Tra-
dition as Transmission, a religious tradition consists solely in chains of testimony
that stretch back to an original encounter with some past events.1 Zagzebski
raises two objections to this model, the first of which is that it fails to explain
how such a tradition can be a source of knowledge:
On the chain model it is crucial that the chain is unbroken and
that the transmission is accurate. This model assumes that what is
transmitted remains the same as what it was at the point of origin.
Revelation in this model is fragile because every time it passes from
hand to hand, it runs the risk that some of it gets lost or distorted.
On this model nobody can be as justified in a belief acquired through
the mechanism of the tradition than the person who had divine
contact at the beginning of the chain. The nearer one is to the
source of revelation, the more complete and accurate the knowledge.
Given that we are so far in time from the origin of the chain, the
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1As Zagzebski puts it, on this model the transmission of a tradition is reducible to chains
of testimony. What justifies belief in what the tradition transmits is a relation to something
that happened at the originfor example, the experience of Moses on Sinai, the Apostles'
experience of Jesus Christ, or the revelation of Muhammad, and what happened at the origin
is understood as immediate contact with the divine, the experience of which is transmitted
by oral and written testimony to the present (p. 193).
1
most we can do is to study old sources in greater depth, or perhaps
discover ancient books that were lost at some point along the chain.
(p. 193)
As she notes, Zagzebski's argument here parallels a passage in Locke's Essay,
where he writes that any Testimony, the farther off it is from the original Truth,
the less force and proof it has:
The Being and Existence of the thing it self, is what I call the original
Truth. A credible Man vouching his Knowledge of it, is a good proof:
But if another equally credible, do witness it from his Report, the
Testimony is weaker; and a third that attests the Hear-say of an
Hear-say, is yet less considerable. So that in traditional Truths,
each remove weakens the force of the proof : And the more hands
the Tradition has successively passed through, the less strength and
evidence does it receive from them. (Bk. IV, ch. xvi, 10)2
For Zagzebski as for Locke, the fallibility of human testimony means that a
person who believes a proposition on the say-so of another is necessarily in
a worse epistemic position than the person whose testimony she believes. In
Zagzebski's view, this shows that an adequate model of religious tradition must
take it to involve more than mere chains of testimony, at least if it is to explain
the possibility of genuine religious knowledge.
As I read him, Thomas Aquinas endorses the opposite position in his dis-
cussion of sacred doctrine (what we today call theology) in the first chapter
of the Summa Theologiae:
Sacred doctrine is a science. Yet bear in mind sciences differ
from each other. Some work from first principles known by the
natural light of the intellect  such as arithmetic, geometry, and
the like. Others, however, work from principles known by the light
of a higher science. Optics, for instance, begins from geometrical
principles, and music proceeds from arithmetical ones.
Sacred doctrine is a science in the second sense here, for it pro-
ceeds from principles made known by a higher science  that of God
and the blessed. So, just as music relies on principles taken from
arithmetic, sacred doctrine relies on principles revealed by God. (ST
I, q. 1, a. 2, c.)3
2For a similar position with respect to demonstrative reasoning, see Book I, Part IV,
Section 1 of Hume's Treatise (Of scepticism with regard to reason). Hume's argument there
suggests a bad company objection to Locke's and Zagzebski's: inference is fallible, so if my
belief that p is based on inference, then by parity of reasoning I should know it less well than
I know what it is based on. Some philosophers would accept this consequence, but I expect
that Zagzebski will not. For related discussion, see T. Burge, Content Preservation, The
Philosophical Review 102: 457-488.
3In Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Questions on God, ed. B. Davies and B. Leftow (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
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In calling theology a science (scientia), Aquinas means to distinguish it from
uncertain or merely probable bodies of knowledge or opinion, categorizing it
instead as the sort of demonstrative understanding described by Aristotle in
the Posterior Analytics.4 This generates a puzzle, however, since according
to Aristotle such understanding must proceed from self-evident first-principles,
and even sensory perception is ruled out as a source of understanding in this
strict sense. Aquinas' response to the puzzle is contained in the passage quoted
above: he holds that one body of scientific knowledge will sometimes borrow
some of its first principles from another scientia, as the principles of music are
not proved within music itself, but rather within mathematics. Applied to the
present case, Aquinas' claim is that the scientia of divine things that we have
through sacred theology is based on God's immediate knowledge of himself,
which is shared with human beings through God's special revelation and the
teaching of the church. Yet he insists that this does not render theology any
more fragile than other bodies of knowledge, but rather that it is made more
certain through this mediation than it would be if it had been based on human
reason alone:
We reckon one theoretical science to be more noble than another first
because of the certitude it brings ... The science of sacred doctrine
surpasses the others [on this count], because theirs comes from the
natural light of human reason, which can make mistakes, whereas
sacred doctrine is held in the light of God's knowledge which cannot
be mistaken. (ST I, q. 1, a. 5, c.; and cf. II-II, q. 2, a. 4, c.)
While Aquinas accepts that the knowledge of God that we attain in this way is
less perfect than knowledge gained through epistemically unmediated contact
with the divine (see e.g. ST I, q. 12, a. 11), the explanation of this has to do
with the inability of humans in our present state to understand divine things
except by comparing them to created ones, and not with any lack of certainty
arising from the mediation of chains of testimony. Unlike Zagzebski, Aquinas
sees no problem in the idea that such chains are able to transmit religious
knowledge.
I believe that Aquinas' view of this matter is correct, and that the model
of religious tradition in terms of testimonial transmission is perfectly able to
explain how later generations in a religious tradition can have knowledge at
least as secure as that of their ancestors. Section 3 will argue for this, inspired
by some arguments in Tony Coady's seminal work Testimony: A Philosophical
Study.5 In the concluding section, I will consider Zagzebski's other objection to
Tradition as Transmission, arguing that it is more successful than this first one.
4See G. Turner, St Thomas Aquinas on the `Scientific' Nature of Theology, New Black-
friars 78: 464-476.
5C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), ch.
11. It's worth noting that Coady's brief discussion of Aquinas in pp. 16-17 of Testimony
gets his view flatly wrong, and reads Aquinas as holding that faith cannot be a source of
knowledge. (Part of the fault lies with the translation that Coady is working from.) A more
detailed discussion of how Aquinas' views relate to contemporary work on testimony will have
to wait for another essay.
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3 Beyond Telephone
As I see it, Zagzebski's initial argument against the model of Tradition as Trans-
mission requires construing all chains of testimony as similar in structure to a
familiar children's game:6
Telephone People are arranged in a line. Someone whispers a message to the
first person in line, who whispers it to the second, and so on down. Each
person's whisper is inaudible to everyone but the person she is whispering
to. When the message reaches the end of the line, it's reported to the
whole group.
In Telephone, the silliness of the context and the twin difficulties of whispering
clearly and making out what is being whispered to you interact to make it
unlikely that the message will pass through whole and undistorted. As Zagzebski
and Locke both note, these risks arise at each link in the chain, and thus the
longer the chain is, the less reliable it will be.
But real-life testimony, including in the context of religious traditions, is
usually quite unlike Telephone, which after all is just a game designed to result
in a silly outcome. Instead, in everyday life our practice of testimony borrows
features from the following possible variations of the game:
Reliable Like Telephone, but everyone in the line has been selected because
they are very good at whispering clearly and discerning what is whispered
to them, and have no inclination to mess things up on purpose.
High-Stakes Like Telephone, but not just for fun: the message is seen as very
important, and each person in line has an incentive not to get things
wrong. This leads them to listen very carefully, whisper as clearly as they
can, and never distort the message on purpose.
The elements of Reliable and High-Stakes that are missing from Telephone make
it much less likely that any particular act of transmission will distort the orig-
inal message, and so increase the reliability of the transmitted signal. And it
seems clear that the transmissional practices of most religious traditions have
features that mirror each of these: in general, the only individuals lincensed
to speak authoritatively about doctrinal matters are those with some kind of
specialized training, and the matters under discussion are serious enough to the
participants in the practice that there should be a strong incentive to transmit
them accurately.7
But that is not all. Consider now the following further variations on the
original:
6As Coady writes, the Lockean conception of hearsay assimilates transmission to mere
mimicry, like a series of parrots imitating each other (Testimony, p. 221).
7Coady makes a similar point in Testimony, p. 216. Of course things may go the other
way, too: recognizing the vital importance of a religious tradition might tempt those who
guard it to distort its content in various ways, perhaps to serve their own ends.
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Criss-Crossing Like Telephone, except that the chain of transmission isn't
simply linear: instead of A relaying the message to B, B to C, and so
on, there will be cases where a member of the chain whispers the message
to more than one person, or receives the message from more than one
source.8
Convergence Like Telephone, except that the initial message is whispered to
several different people, each of whom begins a chain that converges on a
single person at the end.9
Back-Tracking Like Telephone, except that sometimes the message passes
back through someone earlier in the line, who has the opportunity to
correct the message if it has been disorted.
Once again, the features of Criss-Crossing, Convergence, and Back-Tracking
that make them different from Telephone also make the messages they transmit
much less fragile. Specifically, in Criss-Crossing and Convergence there is the
possibility of corroboration or non-corroboration10 that brings to light poten-
tial errors or enables participants to be more confident in the message they are
passing along, and the additional mechanism in Back-Tracking constitutes a
straightforward way to correct errors. And as before, the transmissional prac-
tices of religious traditions involve many of these elements, in contrast to the
purely linear model suggested by Telephone.
Here is one further set of variations that do even more to increase reliability:
Double-Checking Like Telephone, except that each member of the chain is
permitted to overhear what the next one says, and to correct her if the
message has been transmitted wrongly.
Conferral Like Criss-Crossing, but when multiple people hear the same mes-
sage they are permitted to discuss with one another what it is, and decide
on a single message that will be relayed down the line.11
Supervision Like Telephone, but now there is someone overseeing the entire
process, ensuring that the message has been relayed accurately and cor-
recting participants if it hasn't been.
Each of Double-Checking, Conferral, and Supervision adds another element that
is missing from Telephone and the earlier variations on it, in that they are so
structured that errors are corrected not only by chance, but deliberately and
in a way that is built into the transmissional practice. And once again, many
religious traditions have elements that mirror these: similar to Double-Checking,
those who transmit religious doctrine are usually around to witness how their
teachings are conveyed by others, and intervene if things go wrong; similar to
8For a similar suggestion, see Coady, Testimony, pp. 214-215.
9Compare Coady, Testimony, pp. 212-213.
10On the epistemic value of non-corroboration, see Coady, Testimony, pp. 213-214.
11Thanks to Angela Schwenkler for suggesting this variation.
5
Conferral, it is possible for participants in a tradition to check with one another
to ensure that the message is being received and transmitted accurately; and 
more controversially, certainly, but centrally for someone like Aquinas  similar
to Supervision, the entire process is often thought to be governed by some kind of
divine oversight that helps to eliminate errors. (Of course that may be mythical,
but insisting on that point would be question-begging in this context.)
Finally, note that all of these modified Telephone scenarios can be combined,
I think indefinitely: thus we could imagine a situation in which there are multiple
first witnesses who then create chains that diverge, backtrack, and converge;
always double-checking, collaborating, and under the watch of a careful overseer;
with participants who are highly reliable and motivated to get things right.
The result of this will be a transmissional practice involving nothing more than
chains of testimony and the oversight thereof, but whose outcome seems to be,
as Aquinas suggests, at least as certain as most of the products of fallible human
reason. If this isn't complete and accurate knowledge, then very little of what
we humans attain ever is.
Perhaps Zagzebski will reply that even if these cases show that reliance on
the testimonial transmission of doctrine needn't render a religious tradition too
epistemically fragile for its later members to have any religious knowledge at
all, still there is some degredation that necessarily occurs when information is
passed from one person to another. (Even if we imagine a Supervision-style
case where the overseer is omnipotent, omniscient, and dead-set on ensuring
the fidelity of the message, there may still be questions about whom we are to
trust, and to what degree.) I am not sure about this, though: for one thing, in
Double-Checking and Conferral the ability to confer with one's peers, plus the
knowledge that one's predecessors have done the same, might justify those of
us later on in the chain in being every bit as certain than the original witness
or witnesses, if not more so. But here is one more variation that still fits the
model of Tradition as Transmission, yet where those later on in the chain seem
to be in an epistemically superior position to those who begin it:
Summation Like Convergence, but each original witness is given only a proper
part of the message, which is put back together when the chains of testi-
mony converge.12
The inspiration for Summation is the well-known parable of the blind men
and the elephant: each one is touching some part of the beast and can report
only what he feels; but we, who hear those reports, can combine them into an
account of what they perceive that goes beyond each of their contributions. (I
don't mean to say that the world's religions are like this.) Even if there has been
some opportunity for each of their messages to be distorted before reaching us,
still it could be that the sum of those messages tells us more about what they
witnessed than any one of them heard in isolation.
I conclude that the model of Tradition as Transmission can account for
the cross-generational stability of religious knowledge, contrary to Zagzebski's
12For a similar case, see Coady's discussion of the 1983 Australian bushfires, in Testimony,
p. 214.
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argument. But still it strikes me as insufficient, for reasons I expect Zagzebski
will agree with. I turn to these in the final section.
4 Insularity
By my lights, the real problem with a pure model of Tradition as Transmission
is not that testimonial transmission is too epistemically unreliable to extend
religious knowledge to subsequent generations, but that the model is too insular
in the way it envisions the development of a religious tradition and the role of
faith in the life of religious believers.
The first way in which the pure model of Tradition as Transmission embodies
an overly insular conception of faith is that it fails to recognize how knowledge
from outside a tradition can interact with the knowledge that is transmitted by
it. To see this, consider one more imaginary case, now different from Telephone
in a more fundamental way than the earlier variations on it:
Background A person is in receipt of knowledgeable testimony that p. She
also knows other things relevant to the subject, which helps to situate
p in a broader context. Thanks to this background knowledge and her
willingness to situate what she learns within it, she becomes even more
knowledgeable about this matter than others before her who have testified
to it.13
As with Summation, the case of Background is one where the epistemic situ-
ation of a person later on in a chain of testimony is epistemically superior to
the positions of those nearer the source. In this case, however, this is not be-
cause she is in receipt of more testimony than her predecessors, but because
she does not rest content with what she is told, instead combining it with other
things she knows to yield a level of understanding superior to that conveyed by
the tradition alone. All this is possible because in contrast to Telephone and
its variants (including High-Stakes, where transmissional accuracy is the only
goal), the person described in Background is concerned not just with discern-
ing and conveying a given message, but also with getting at the truth of what
the message is about. (As Coady puts it, in taking the word of a witness and
passing it along to another person it is essential that you treat the message as
a worthwhile contribution to settling some issue.14) And as Aquinas writes
in discussing the value of philosophical argumentation in theological matters, if
truth is our concern then it should not matter where it comes from:
... the gifts of grace are so added to nature that they do not destroy
it, but rather perfect it; so too the light of faith, which is infused
in us by grace, does not destroy the light of natural reason divinely
13Similarly, Coady (Testimony, p. 216) suggests the possibility of using archaeological
evidence to demonstrate the reliability of an oral tradition. His point there is somewhat
different than mine, however. He comes closer to describing a Background-style case with his
discussion of Kit Carson and the Indians on p. 219.
14Testimony, p. 220.
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placed within us. And although the natural light of the human mind
is insufficient to manifest the things made manifest by faith, still it
is impossible that those things which have been divinely taught us
through faith should be contrary to what hass been placed in us by
nature. For one of them would have to be false, but since both come
to us from God, God would have to be the author of falsity, which
is impossible. (On Boethius' De Trinitate, q. 2, a. 3, c.)15
Aquinas' immediate concern in this passage is to defend the use of philosophical
texts and arguments as means to defend the faith and correct those who deviate
from it, but his own theological writings are clearly in the spirit of Background
as well: he treats the light of natural reason as a source of knowledge of
the material world and its creator, and draws constantly on philosophical and
scientific concepts to extend his knowledge beyond what is simply conveyed to
him by his tradition. In this way he accepts what has been transmitted to
him by his forebears but also improves on that tradition from within, just as
Augustine and other Christian thinkers had done before him.16
As I suggested above, part of what makes it possible for a healthy religious
tradition to relate in this way to sources of knowledge that lie outside the tradi-
tion itself is the fact that its participants conceive of it not merely as a vehicle
for transmitting a message, but also as a means of getting at some important
truths. That these truths are seen as important truths helps such traditions to
evade what I see as Zagzebski's more incisive criticism of the simple model of
Tradition as Transmission:
This model canot explain how a religious tradition is transmitted
without some additional elements. Why would it matter to us what
a man called Abraham did, or that Moses had a religious experience
in front of a burning bush if we are only the distant recipients of
testimony about their contact with God? If what tradition passes
on is a reconstruction of someone's experience a long time ago, it is
hard to see it as anything more than a historical curiosity, and their
written texts as anything more than artifacts of an ancient culture.
Chains of testimony do not add up to a tradition in a sense that
pertains to religious belief unless the content of the testimony bears
on the future recipients of the testimony. (p. 193)
Clearly, the point Zagzebski is making here applies even if a chain of testimony
is so structured as to convey its message with perfect accuracy from one end to
the other: in order to see this chain as part of a tradition in any meaningful
sense, we need to know why the message is important to its members, and
what real-life questions they take it to help them settle. This is, once again,
something that is obviously missing from the set-up in Telephone, where the
15In Aquinas, Selected Writings, ed. R. McInerny (New York: Penguin, 1998).
16Compare Alasdair MacIntyre's description of Aquinas' project in relation to his Aris-
totelian and Augustinian roots, in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), chs. 5-6.
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content of the message has no bearing on what people do outside the context
of the game. And as I have emphasized, it is precisely because of the vital
importance of what a religious tradition conveys that such traditions are able to
embody transmissional practices that can convey information reliably in a way
that the arrangement in Telephone does not.
The remarks I have just quoted also identify a further way that the model of
Tradition as Transmission is overly insular, namely that religious faith  at least
of the living variety, if indeed there is any other  is not just a matter of ac-
cepting the truth of certain doctrines, but also requires a more-or-less thorough
integration of that attitude with the other aspects of one's life.17 Because of
this, religious traditions don't convey bodies of doctrine alone, but also numer-
ous things that are supposed to aid in the practice of faith, such as liturgy and
other communal rituals, traditional practices of prayer and private meditation,
various kinds of music and visual art, stories of individuals who lives were some-
how exemplary, ethical codes and catalogues of important virtues, and so on.
Separated from these elements, religious faith runs the risk of degenerating into
mere attachment to vague ideals or to the past for its own sake, with no sense of
its living relevance. And as Zagzebski notes, all this means that the recognition
of a religious tradition as authoritative is not just a matter of evaluating the
truth of its doctrines, but also of seeing how engagement with the community
in its practical directives will inform one's life as a whole.18 At the same time,
anyone who does take the teachings of their tradition as more than a historical
curiosity is bound to regard them in the way Aquinas suggests, as truths that
can stand in a mutually informing relationship with things that are known in
other ways. And this would be unreasonable if what the tradition transmitted
could not be counted as knowledge.
17Thanks to Jon Butacci for encouraging me to develop this point. My talk of acceptance is
deliberate: I have in mind a purely intellectual attitude taken toward a proposition, without
any affective component or immediate dispositions to act on this basis. On the distinction
between acceptance and belief, see L.J. Cohen, Belief and Acceptance, Mind 98: 367-389.
On the centrality of affect to religious faith, see J.L. Kvanvig, Affective Theism and People
of Faith, Midwest Studies in Philosophy 37: 109-128.
18E.g. she writes: ... trust hat a particular religious tradition puts one in the best position
to get at the truth depends in part on trust that it contains the highest attainment of the
human spirit in relation to God. But to think that, one must have nonepistemic trust in
the tradition and would need to determine that the tradition has that quality by the fact
that its teachings satisfy conscientious reflection upon one's total set of psychic states, not
just one's set of beliefs (Epistemic Authority, p. 200). And again: The Church is more
than a body with the authority to reveal truths of faith and morals. There are other natural
desires ... which can be better satisfied by participation in a wisdom community than on
one's own. These desires include the desire to know and do the good, to acquire not just
knowledge, but understanding, to learn patterns of living and principles of action that result
in a more integrated self, to be surrounded by grace and beauty, and to experience the delights
of living among persons whose own pursuit of those ends enhances one's own. The authority
of a community can be justified by a conscientious judgment that these desires will be more
satisfied by participation in the community (p. 201).
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